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5.1  Introduction 
The welfare of the elderly in the United States is a major social and po- 
litical concern for a number of reasons. First, the fraction of the popula- 
tion over sixty-five years of age has increased and is projected to increase 
dramatically. Second, because of a limited ability to participate in the la- 
bor market, the elderly may be particularly harmed by fluctuations in real 
asset values. Erosion in the financial position of the elderly may have oc- 
curred in the 1970s due to the poor performance of stock and bond mar- 
kets and the unexpected, rapid rate of inflation. Third, the elderly are the 
beneficiaries of a number of large and growing federal transfer programs. 
Chief among these is Social Security, Medicare, and Supplemental Secur- 
ity Income (SSI). In combination, these programs are designed to put a 
floor under the income available to  the retired population. 
In two previous papers we began to  examine how the elderly have fared 
with the combination of  inflation, poor financial market returns,  and 
massive federal programs (Hurd and Shoven 1982b, 1983). In those pa- 
pers we found the following: 
1. The cost of living increased the same percentage for the elderly as for 
the general population in the 1960s and 1970s. The Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) exaggerated the increase in the price level for all groups (because of 
an inappropriately high weight on housing), but the effect of the different 
consumption bundles of people in different age categories proves to be 
negligible. 
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2. The real income of the elderly rose faster than that of the nonelderly 
during the  1970s, whether income is measured on a per person or per 
household basis. This occurred despite the decreased labor force partici- 
pation of the elderly and the increased labor force participation of the 
nonelderly. 
3. Related to 2 above, even the poor among the elderly improved their 
position in the last two decades. The percent of elderly below the official 
poverty line had decreased from 1960 levels by well over half by 1977. 
4. The composition of income of the elderly has changed markedly over 
the period. The biggest changes are the decline in the importance of labor 
income and the increase in the government-provided health care insurance 
(income in kind). Old Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) and private pen- 
sions have grown somewhat in their share of the elderly’s income. 
We began a detailed examination of the income and wealth of the el- 
derly and their inflation vulnerability by analyzing the Social Security Ad- 
ministration’s Retirement History Survey (RHS). Our earlier work used 
the 1969-75  waves of that longitudinal survey, as they were the only ones 
available. This chapter is very much an extension of our earlier work: it 
uses the full 1969-79 RHS data and explores in depth some of the results 
we found interesting from the earlier work. In particular, we now tabulate 
detailed income statements (as well as balance sheets) for the RHS popu- 
lation and subpopulations for 1969, 1975, and 1979. We emphasize these 
three years, but we use the 1971, 1973, and 1977 files to fill in values that 
are missing in the three years under examination. In preparing this mate- 
rial, we have changed our use of the data from our earlier papers. While in 
the past we only examined households that survived in the sample through 
1975, we now include all households in each wave (regardless of whether 
they appear in subsequent surveys). This both expands our sample in 1969 
and eliminates a possible bias in our numbers. The extension of the data to 
1979 is interesting because by that time the RHS population was sixty- 
eight to seventy-four years of age and predominately retired. Also, our 
sample period now encompasses the majority of the inflationary episode 
of the 1970s. Further, the extension of the data allows us to examine 
whether elderly households adjusted their portfolios to the inflationary 
experience  of the early part of the decade. 
We examine in this paper a number of alternative measures of the vul- 
nerability of the wealth of the RHS population to unexpected changes in 
inflation and price level. We  compute how inflation vulnerability varies 
across time, by wealth level, and by marital status. Further, we ask how 
vulnerable the elderly would be if  Social Security retirement annuities 
were not indexed (either implicitly or explicitly). Other measures of how 
much inflation protection government programs offer are presented. We 
examine the entire distribution of inflation vulnerability among the el- 
derly. This gives us a picture of how risky the situation is for those whose 
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5.2  Data 
Our primary data source is the Longitudinal Retirement History Sur- 
vey. In 1969, 11,153 heads of households who were born in the years 1906 
through 191 1  were interviewed. The surviving households were reinter- 
viewed every two years through 1979. In this paper we report results for 
1969, 1975, and 1979; thus the original heads of the households were ages 
fifty-eight through sixty-four, sixty-four through seventy, and sixty-eight 
through seventy-four during these years. Because the original household 
was reinterviewed even though the original head may have died after 
1969, the age of the actual head often falls outside the standard age range. 
Our results cover all the surviving households regardless of the age of the 
actual head. 
Many income and wealth figures are reported in the RHS. We use com- 
prehensive measures of income and wealth, which we  finally aggregate 
into thirty-seven income categories and forty-two wealth categories. At 
this  level  of  disaggregation,  there will invariably  be  many invalid re- 
sponses and missing data items.  Had we  eliminated observations  with 
missing values in  any of  the income or wealth categories, the sample 
would have been reduced until it was almost useless. Therefore, a substan- 
tial amount of work and care was devoted to filling in missing values. Our 
basic operating principle was to use data from other survey years to infer 
the value in the year of interest. For example, if the respondent indicated 
he owned a house in 1969, but the value of the house was missing, we in- 
ferred the value from the value reported in 1971 with an adjustment for 
housing inflation. If the 1971 value was missing, we used data from later 
years. Thus, we used all six surveys even though we only report results for 
three years. A complete description of the process is given in the appen- 
dix. Our aim was to estimate not only the mean values of the income and 
wealth variables, but the distribution as well; thus, it is important to retain 
the individual  component.  If  the individual component  is  stable over 
time, our procedure will do this. 
In some wealth or income categories, only the wealth component or 
only the income component is given in the RHS. Examples would be the 
value of a house and the income from an annuity. Wealth was converted to 
income at a 3 percent real rate of interest, and income was annuitized ac- 
cording to life tables and whether the income was inflation protected or 
not. Inflation-protected  income was discounted at 3 percent. Other in- 
come was discounted at 6 percent in 1969, 7.75 percent in 1975, and 9.5 
percent in 1979. 
Observations are classified according to family type-married,  single, 
or widowed-and  in the case of singles, by sex. We report results for each 
family type. 
We used one other source of data: we wanted to account for the implicit 
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cia1 data average per elderly Medicare and Medicaid expenditures. The 
procedure is described in the appendix. 
5.3  Income, Wealth,  and Inflation 
In this section we present the basic results on income, wealth, and infla- 
tion vulnerability from the RHS data. Table 5.1 gives the distribution of 
income for  1969, 1975, and  1979 for all households and for different 
marital status groups. Income is comprehensively defined to include the 
insurance value of government-provided health care or insurance and the 
real implicit return on owner-occupied housing. This latter was simply 
taken as 3 percent of the market value of the house. The first thing that is 
apparent in the distributions of table 5.1 is that mean incomes signifi- 
cantly exceed median incomes, indicating that the distribution is skewed 
towards high incomes. In real terms both mean and median incomes de- 
clined for the population over the period. In 1968 dollars, using the Bos- 
kin-Hurd (1982) cost of living estimates, the median income for all house- 
holds was $6,529 in 1968, $5,428 in 1974, and $5,237 in 1978. The average 
income is $8,246 for 1968, $7,230 for 1974, and $6,768 for 1978. The de- 
cline in real income is due solely to the reduced labor force participation 
of this population as they age. This occurs most dramatically between 
1968 when their ages range from fifty-eight to sixty-four and 1974 when 
they range from sixty-four to seventy. Despite the fall in mean and median 
real income, the real income of the lower tail of the distribution has in- 
creased. This is due to the sharp increase in SSI, Medicare, and Social Se- 
curity for this population as most of them become age eligible for the pro- 
grams. In general, the distributions become tighter through time. Another 
fact displayed in table 5.1 is that the distribution of income of single women 
is lower than for single men. This was particularly true in 1968, when 
earnings differentials contributed towards the income differences. 
Table 5.2 presents a detailed breakdown of income composition of the 
RHS sample in 1968. The first striking fact is that earnings are still the ma- 
jor source of income for these people. For all households in the RHS sur- 
vey in 1969 (while the survey took place in 1969, the income reported is 
from 1968), labor earnings amount to 76 percent of total income. Pen- 
sions and Social Security income are relatively unimportant and, as might 
be expected, property and capital income are quite concentrated. For in- 
stance, while the income of those in the upper 10 percent of the wealth dis- 
tribution is three times the average, they receive nearly fifty times as much 
interest and dividends. The poorest 10 percent of the population in terms 
of wealth have incomes that average only $732; they have little labor in- 
come, only $160 for the year on average. This compares with an overall 
mean labor income of $6,304. The income of single females is less than 
that of single males, and the difference is more than accounted for in their lhble 5.1 
Households 
1968  1974  1978 
Percentile 
Points 
Nonfarm  Couples  Single Males 









I  I 
793  2,007 
1,362  2,711 
3,745  4,314 
6,529  7,494 
10,595  12,044 
15,689  18,840 
21,062  25,483 

















1,985  3,266 
2,698  3,933 
4,240  5,634 
7,450  9,379 
11,980  14,443 
18,650  21,657 
25,129  29,568 
9,909  12,091 
1,869  3,685 
3,106  4,801 
5,546  6,992 
8,740  10,270 
12,590  15,208 
18,447  22,974 
25,038.  31,426 



























































Observations  10,715  8,070  7,137  9,799  7,483  6,610  6,804  4,535  3,552  1,018  805  745  2,893  2,730  2,840 Table 5.2  Income Statements of the RHS  Sample, 1968 (means in current dollars) 
10%  90%  Single 
Wealth  Wealth 
All  Nonfarm  Tail  Tail  Couples  Singles  Males  Females 
Income from 
1.  House 
2.  Farm 
3.  Business 
4.  Other real property 
5.  Interest received 
6.  Interest paid 
Income from 
7.  Pensions and annuities 
8.  SSI 
9.  Welfare and other 
10.  Insurance value of 
11.  Social Security 
12.  Transfers from relatives 
13.  Labor earnings 
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respective labor earnings. The mean 1968 labor earnings of the single fe- 
males in the RHS sample is 63 percent of the males, a figure that is ap- 
proximately the female/male average wage ratio for any date on  record. It 
might be noted that Social Security is higher on average for single women 
than single men. This is probably because widows can begin collecting re- 
tirement annuities at age sixty and, therefore, more of them are age eligi- 
ble than the rest of the singles. 
Table 5.3 contains the same information for 1974 income. Earnings ac- 
count for only 37 percent of income for the sample as a whole. As before, 
labor earnings form a lower fraction of  income for the poor than the 
wealthy. It appears that people who are wealthy tend to work longer. Even 
in the age range sixty-four to seventy years, over half the income of those 
in the upper 10 percent wealth tail is derived from labor earnings. The in- 
come flows from pensions and Social Security are much larger in 1974 
than 1968 because of  greater eligibility and retirement.  By  1974 single 
women no longer receive more Social Security than single males. This is 
presumably because both are now age eligible for the program. The in- 
come of those in the lowest wealth tail is still very low ($1,820 on average), 
but has increased significantly relative to the mean income level. This is 
because of the large government transfer programs that are age tested. 
Table 5.4 shows the 1978 income statements. Earnings continue to de- 
cline in importance,  accounting for  17  percent of  income on average. 
Earnings are much more important for the wealthy, producing 28 percent 
of their income. Single male incomes, which at younger ages exceeded fe- 
male incomes because of labor earnings, are, by  1978, greater than in- 
comes of women due in large part to larger pensions. The combination of 
income from Social Security, SSI, and Medicare is much more evenly dis- 
tributed than other income. Therefore, one does get the impression that 
these programs in combination somewhat reduce inequality among the el- 
derly. Private pensions on the other hand seem at least as concentrated as 
total income. Those in the upper tail get 15 percent of  their income from 
pensions and annuities, while this source accounts for only 4  percent of 
the income of those in the lowest 10 percent wealth tail. 
Table 5.5 begins to present the wealth data. It shows the mean wealth 
and income levels for those reporting positive values and the percentage 
of those reporting positive values. This permits us to separate the change 
in mean value into a change in “participation” and a change in mean value 
of those participating. The table indicates that the RHS population did 
not sell their homes as they aged. Roughly 70 percent of  the households 
own their own homes for the full ten years. The mean value of their homes 
increased faster than the general price level, as is well known. The homes 
of the elderly increased in value at about the same rate as the increase in 
the home ownership index of the CPI: from table 5.5 we find that market 
values of houses increased by  123  percent between  1969 and  1979; the Tnble 5.3  Income Statements of the RHS Sample, 1974 (means in current dollars) 
10%  90%  Single 
Wealth  Wealth 
All  Nonfarm  Tail  Tail  Couples  Singles  Males  Females 
Income from 
1. House  565  503  137  1,372  740  340  315  347 
2.  Farm  139  66  -6  746  190  74  115  61 
3.  Business  75  76  2  56 1  121  16  18  15 
4.  Other real property  475  454  33  2,549  682  209  155  225 
5. Interest received  956  973  43  4,725  1,261  565  639  543 










Pensions and annuities 
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Welfare and other 
transfers 
Insurance value of 
Medicare-Medicaid 
Social Security 



































































Observations  8,070  7,483  807  807  4,535  3,535  805  2,730 
Note: Convert 1974 dollars to 1968 dollars by multiplying by  .724 (Boskin-Hurd index). able  5.4  Income Statements of the RHS Sample, 1978 (means in current dollars) 
~~~~~  ~~~~  ~~~ 
10%  90%  Single 
Wealth  Wealth 
Females  Couples  Singles  Males  All  Nonfarm  Tail  Tail 
Income from 
1. House  894  80 1  166  2,388  1,194  596  566  604 
2.  Farm  229  102  5  1,391  299  159  334  113 
3.  Business  73  77  -  10  605  111  34  57  29 
4.  Other real property  558  534  99  2,867  813  305  308  305 
5.  Interest received  1,456  1,476  55  7,890  2,082  836  922  814 










Pensions and annuities 
SSI 
Welfare and other 
transfers 
Insurance value of 
Medicare-Medicaid 
Social Security 
Transfers from relatives 
Labor earnings 
Total income 
1,790  1,874 
102  100 
151  152 
1,388  1,375 
3,590  3,618 
12  13 
2,050  1,981 

















































Observations  7,137  6,610  714  714  3,552  3,585  745  2,840 
Note: Convert 1978 dollars to 1968 dollars by  multiplying by  ,551 (Boskin-Hurd index). 'IBble 5.5  Mean Wealth and Income over Households with Positive Values, RHS Sample (current dollars) 
~~~  ~  ~~ 
1969  1979  1979b 
% with  % with  % with 
Positive  Positive  Positive 
Values  Mean  Values  Mean  Values  Mean 
A. Wealth Components 
House, market value 
House, mortgage 
Farm,  market value 
Farm,  mortgage 
Business, market value 
Other property, market 
































































B.  Income Components 
~  ~  ~~~~~  ~~  ~ 
Government pensions 
Private pensions 
8.1  1,992  13.6  4,212  15.5 
5.4  1,970  23.8  2,450  26.6 
5,574 
2,823 
Convert to 1969 dollars by multiplying by .696 (Boskin-Hurd index). 
bConvert  to 1%9 dollars by multiplying by  S23 (Boskin-Hurd index). 135  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
home ownership index in the CPI increased by 126 percent over that pe- 
riod. The percentage of  the households holding a mortgage declined, as 
did the percentage owning farms and businesses. The rapid rise in farm 
values between 1975 and 1979 is clearly shown. There was a decrease in the 
fraction of the RHS population who owned U.S. bonds. A number of rea- 
sons could account for this. First, savings bonds may have been accumu- 
lated during the working period and decumulated during retirement in ac- 
cordance  with  life-cycle  theory.  Second,  the  real  rates  of  return  on 
government securities were very low in both absolute terms and in com- 
parison with other instruments. Finally, this was a period of financial de- 
regulation.  Banks, savings and loans, and other financial organizations 
offered a wide variety of new accounts which made direct participation in 
U.S. security markets less attractive. Participation in the stock and bond 
markets stayed roughly constant with just over one-fifth of the elderly be- 
ing involved. Those who did participate, however, had substantial invest- 
ments, averaging over $30,000 in 1979. The participation in checking ac- 
counts is  high and increasing.  One theory would be that people open 
checking accounts to facilitate the automatic deposit of  federal transfer 
checks. This practice is actively advocated by Social Security. The average 
balance in checking accounts is relatively modest and actually falls in real 
terms. 
Part B of table 5.5 shows participation and average values (flows) con- 
ditional on participation in government and private pensions. Naturally, 
participation increases as this population ages and retires. By  1979, 26.6 
percent of the population is receiving a private pension and 15.5 percent a 
government pension. Note that the amount of government pensions in- 
creases far more than private pensions. For example, between the figures 
reported in 1975 and 1979 (for 1974 and 1978 income, respectively) the 
average government pension grows 32.3 percent, while inflation was 31.4 
percent. Private pensions, on the other hand, go up only 15 percent. In 
both the cases of  private and public pensions, some of the increase is due 
to those who retired  relatively late (between 1975 and  1979) receiving 
above-average pension amounts. This occurs because these people have a 
longer tenure on the job, and their pensions are for the most part inflation 
protected while they continue to work. The evidence of table 5.5 seems 
completely consistent  with  the  findings of  Clark, Allen,  and  Sumner 
(1983) that postretirement increases in private pension benefits offset two- 
fifths of the rise in the Consumer Price Index from 1973 to 1979. Later, 
when we examine the inflation vulnerability of the elderly, we will assume 
that private pensions do not adjust to inflation at all. It should be noted 
that this assumption exaggerates the inflation vulnerability of the elderly. 
In table 5.6 we present average asset and liability holdings in 1969 over 
one entire sample and over a number of subsamples. The pensions and an- 
nuities figures are the capitalized value of the flow either reported as actu- Table 5.6  Balance Sheet of the RHS  Sample, 1969 (mean values in current dollars) 
10%  90%  Single 
Wealth  Wealth 
All  Nonfarm  Tail  Tail  Couples  Singles  Males  Females 
1.  Net house  11,481  10,342  685  35,052  14,460  6,298  5,238  6,671 
2.  Net farm  4,655  1,795  -  18  31,814  6,402  1,617  2,560  1,286 
3.  Net business  3,704  3,787  -941  30,980  5,485  606  973  477 
4.  Net other property  5,233  5,354  1,241  24,115  6,383  3,233  3,176  3,253 
5.  U.S. bonds  765  798  35  3,168  890  547  789  462 
6.  Corporate stocks and bonds  4,694  4,961  56  35,449  6,266  1,959  2,083  1,915 
7.  Loan assets  78 1  743  35  5,047  954  479  63  1  425 
8.  Bank accounts  4,417  4,414  318  15,975  5,054  3,309  3,226  3,338 
9.  Nonproperty debts  (366)  (355)  (237)  (1,492)  (492)  (148)  (276)  (103) 
10. Pensions and annuities  13,663  14,523  318  55,924  14,023  13,038  13,730  12,795 
11.  SSI  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
12. Welfare and other transfers  935  976  492  3,032  758  1,243  863  1,376 
13.  Medicare-Medicaid  7,795  7,752  5,520  8,878  9,194  5,360  4,301  5,733 
14.  Social Security  18,485  18,769  6,605  23,027  23,021  10,595  9,994  10,807 
15. Transfers from relatives  331  352  136  308  28  858  716  908 
16. Total nonhuman wealth  76,573  74,211  14,243  271,275  92,426  48,993  48,003  49,341 
17. Total human wealth  28,440  28,848  9,312  54,632  38,177  11,500  18,599  9,002 
66,602  58,343  18. Total wealth  105,013  103,059  23,555  325,907  130,602  60,492 
Observations  10,715  9,799  1,072  1,072  6,804  3,911  1,018  2,893 137  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
ally received or anticipated. The SSI number is zero since the program was 
not yet in effect. Social Security and Medicare wealth are again the cap- 
italized flows for which households qualify based on their work history to 
date. Human wealth is the capitalized value of future labor earnings dis- 
counted for time, mortality, and labor force participation. The details of 
these calculations  are described  in the appendix.  The mean  wealth is 
$105,013 of which $28,440 is the present value of future earnings and 
$26,280 is Social Security and Medicare. The most striking information in 
the table, however, may be the distribution of wealth. The average wealth 
of the poorest 10 percent of the population is $23,555 and, of that, $9,312 
is human wealth. Fully 89 percent of their nonhuman wealth is composed 
of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and welfare and other trans- 
fers. On average, all other assets sum to only $1,626 for this group. The 
level of human wealth is very low: the poor in nonhuman wealth are also 
poor in future labor earnings. Apparently there is a persistent pattern of 
low lifetime income that results, naturally, in very little wealth. In con- 
trast, the transfer programs just listed amount to 36 percent of the wealth 
of the whole population and only 13 percent of the wealth of those in the 
upper 10 percent of the wealth distribution. 
Those in the wealthiest 10 percent of the RHS sample in 1969 have an 
average 3.1 times as much wealth as the entire population. Their average 
housing wealth is the same multiple of the overall average housing wealth, 
but they have farms and businesses that are 7.5 times as valuable as the 
population average, and have 7.6 times as much invested in stocks and 
bonds. Private pension wealth is roughly as concentrated in the upper 
wealth tail as is wealth in general. In absolute terms, the wealthy get more 
welfare and other transfers than the population as a whole. This is prob- 
ably due to their receipt of more unemployment compensation and dis- 
ability payments.  The table indicates that couples are roughly twice as 
wealthy as singles, and that among singles, males and females have about 
the same nonhuman wealth. Males, on average, can expect more labor 
earnings (human capital). Even if  females had the same wealth figures, 
they would in some sense be financially worse off since they must use this 
money to finance a longer expected lifetime. 
Table  5.7 contains the balance  sheets for the  same subpopulations 
of the RHS sample as table 5.6, but the figures are for 1975. We should 
note that the composition of the subpopulations changed between 1969 
and 1975; in particular, there was a growing number of singles because of 
the death of a spouse. Perhaps the first thing one notices about this table 
is that  human  wealth  becomes  small.  On average,  the  present  value 
of  expected labor earnings amounts to only 6 percent of  total wealth. 
Nonhuman wealth increases slightly faster than the CPT.  Using that index 
to deflate the 1975 total nonhuman wealth figure to 1969 dollars results 
in a $78,900 figure, some  3  percent  higher than nonhuman  wealth  in Table  5.7  Balance Sheet of the RHS Sample, 1975 (mean values in  current dollars) 
10%  90%  Single 
Wealth  Wealth 
All  Nonfarm  Tail  Tail  Couples  Singles  Males  Females 
I. Net house  18,828  16,775  1,232  56,031  24,680  11,321  10,494  11,565 
2.  Net farm  4,631  2,203  -  636  34,329  6,326  2,457  3,845  2,048 
4.  Net other property  5,807  5,828  299  33,171  8,314  2,591  2,667  2,566 
5. U.S. bonds  93  1  940  40  3,255  1,120  689  880  633 
6.  Corporate stocks and bonds  5,878  6,197  44  44,303  8,366  2,686  3,199  2,535 
7.  Loan assets  1,586  1,555  45  9,024  2,205  792  850  775 
8.  Bank accounts  9,270  9,243  62 1  32,793  11,326  6,632  6,922  6,546 
9. Nonproperty debts  (519)  (533)  (719)  (262)  (335)  (241)  (1,341)  (1,593) 
10.  Pensions and annuities  16,842  17,362  1,439  61,814  22,619  9,430  12,813  8,433 
11. SSI  816  84 1  2,154  165  46 1  1,271  805  1,409 
12. Welfare and other transfers  1,140  1,148  625  1,933  1,158  1,117  1,350  1,048 
13. Medicare-Medicaid  11,985  11,895  8,362  14,270  14,961  8,167  6,878  8,547 
14.  Social Security  36,144  36,365  11,755  49,783  47,700  21,319  20,295  21,621 
15. Transfers from relatives  103  102  126  181  49  172  20  217 
16. Total nonhuman wealth  115,935  112,425  25,171  361,656  152,983  68,921  71,289  66,840 
17. Total human wealth  7,340  7,232  1,804  19,936  10,396  3,419  3,755  3,319 
18.  Total wealth  123,275  119,657  26,975  381,592  163,379  72,348  75,044  70,159 
Observations  8,070  7,483  807  807  4,535  3,535  805  2,730 
3.  Net business  2,494  2,524  -216  20,866  4,033  518  612  490 
Noie: Convert 1975 dollars to 1969 dollars by multiplying by  .%9 (Boskin-Hurd index). 139  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
1969.  Pension wealth drops in real terms (partly due, of course, to shorter 
remaining  life expectancy), but  Social Security wealth more than off- 
sets this  decline.  Bank  accounts grow,  perhaps  due to the  aforemen- 
tioned easing of  regulations  and automatic deposit  of  federal transfer 
payments. 
The poorest group still has very little nontransfer wealth. Social Secur- 
ity,  SSI, Medicare and Medicaid, and welfare amount to 91 percent of 
their nonhuman wealth. Other assets amount to only $2,275,  of which 
$1,232  is house equity. The richest 10 percent continue to have a dispro- 
portionate amount of farm, business, and stock and bond wealth. The in- 
stitution of SSI equalizes wealth somewhat, since unlike other transfer 
programs, the wealthy seem to be effectively excluded from this program. 
Couples now have slightly more than twice as much as singles, and among 
the singles, the men have a little more wealth than the women. 
Table 5.8 gives the analogous numbers for 1979. By  this time, human 
wealth is trivial, barely accounting for 2  percent of total wealth. Social Se- 
curity accounts for 28 percent of total wealth, about the same percentage 
as in 1975 and sharply up from the 18 percent figure of 1969.  The fact that 
government transfer programs make up the vast majority of the wealth of 
the poor amongst the elderly continues to be true. In 1979,  SSI, Social Se- 
curity, Medicare and Medicaid, and welfare total 86 percent of the nonhu- 
man wealth of those in the lowest 10 percent of the wealth distribution. 
The same programs  amount to 19 percent of the nonhuman wealth of 
those in the upper 10 percent tail. The patterns reamin roughly the same. 
The mean real value of  nonhuman wealth declines, though very little. The 
1979 figure expressed in 1975 dollars would be $113,000  versus the 1975 
figure of almost $116,OOO.  Such a trivial decline seems inconsistent with 
the life-cycle theory since these people have “consumed” at least 20 per- 
cent of their life expectancy between 1975 and 1979.  In fact, the decline in 
Social Security wealth (due exclusively to the aging of  the population) 
more than accounts for the decline in total wealth. Other assets that de- 
cline in real value are pensions and annuities,  and stocks and bonds. 
Houses, bank account balances, and Medicare wealth all grow at rates fas- 
ter than inflation. 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 give a more complete picture of the wealth distribu- 
tions in 1969,  1975,  and 1979.  The former shows the distributions of total 
wealth (including human capital) and the latter includes only nonhuman 
wealth. The first point is that the wealth distributions changed far less 
from 1969 to 1979 than did the income distributions in table 5.1. This is 
because the 1969 wealth figures include the capitalized expected value of 
assets (such as Social Security and Medicare), which generated no current 
income in 1969.  Further, there is only a weak link between human capital 
and 1969  labor income because retirement age varies widely and a six-year 
age difference occurs between some of the households in the sample. One Table 5.8  Balance Sheet of the RHS Sample, 1979 (mean values in current dollars) 
10%  90%  Single 
Wealth  Wealth 
All  Nonfarm  Tail  Tail  Couples  Singles  Males  Females 
1. Net house  29,784  26,704  1,418  94,819  39,792  19,868  18,864  20,131 
2.  Net farm  7,619  3,389  46  59,715  9,%9  5,292  11,147  3,756 
3.  Net business  2,418  2,559  -  836  22,505  3,699  1,149  1,901  95 1 
4. Net other property  8,969  9,005  1,974  41,961  12,409  5,561  5,099  5,683 
5. U.S.  bonds  897  920  32  2,963  1,131  665  924  597 
6.  Corporate stocks and bonds  6,654  6,975  92  46,756  10,330  3,010  3,848  2,791 
7.  Loan assets  2,020  2,028  35  12,689  2,925  1,123  1,211  1,100 
8.  Bank accounts  13,214  13,026  775  49,455  17,769  8,701  9,675  8,446 
9.  Nonproperty debts  (388)  (41 1)  (230)  (2,192)  (621)  (157)  (300)  (  120) 
10. Pensions and annuities  17,304  18,017  1,552  57,327  24,839  9,838  14,115  8,716 
11.  SSI  1,157  1,138  3,503  439  777  1,534  853  1,713 
12.  Welfare and other transfers  1,093  1,099  522  3,037  1,192  996  1,320  91 1 
13.  Medicare-Medicaid  17,836  17,717  11,919  21,760  23,429  12,294  9,875  12,929 
14.  Social Security  43,767  44,008  14,240  64,131  60,886  26,805  25,346  27,188 
15.  Transfers from relatives  93  99  51  12  46  140  15  173 
16.  Total nonhuman wealth  152,437  146,273  35,094  475,378  208,571  96,820  103,894  94,964 
17.  Total human wealth  3,876  3,850  982  14,320  6,095  1,677  1,228  1,795 
18.  Total wealth  156,313  150,124  36,076  489,698  214,666  98,497  105,122  96,759 
Observations  7,137  6,610  714  714  3,552  3,585  745  2,840 
Note:  Convert 1979 dollars to 1969 dollars by multiplying by S23 (Boskin-Hurd index). Table 5.9  Total Wealth Distribution of  RHS Sample (current dollars) 
Single 
Percentile  All 



























































































21,640  19,876 
27,228  25,014 
36,702  36,003 
54,650  55,402 
86,580  92,078 
130,659  133,682 
170,862  178,758 








70,159 TPble 5.9 (continued) 
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Convert to 1969 dollars by multiplying by  .696 (Boskin-Hurd index). 
bConvert  to 1969 dollars by multiplying by  323 (Boskin-Hurd index). Table 5.10  Nonhuman Wealth Distribution of RHS Sample 
(current dollars) 
Single 
Percentile  All 



































































26,759  26,727  53,944  20,828  19,581  21,091 
33,977  33,533  64,986  25,970  24,422  26,744 
52,591  51,097  88,194  35,532  34,554  35,815 
90,604  88,488  121,753  51,577  52,918  51,147 
139,102  136,022  168,309  81,328  82,960  80,769 
204,432  1%,808  247,111  125,958  131,425  122,620 
274,016  259,235  340,658  162,816  169,453  162,073 
115,935  112,425  152,983  68,921  71,289  66,840 Table 5.10 (continued) 
Single 
Percentile  All 


























































“Convert to 1969 dollars by multiplying by .6% (Boskin-Hurd index). 
bConvert  to 1969 dollars by multiplying by 323 (Boskin-Hurd index). 145  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
notices in both tables 5.9 and 5.10 that median wealth figures are far be- 
low the mean. There is a large dispersion in the wealth distribution, slightly 
more so with singles than with couples. Among singles, the female wealth 
distribution is slightly more compact than that for males. All the total 
wealth  distributions  of  table  5.9 become more  compact  in real terms 
through time. For instance, the lower five percentile points remain about 
constant whereas the median and ninty-five percentile points fall consid- 
erably in real terms. The fall of these higher percentile points in real terms 
is partly due to the decline in human capital wealth. The big change occurs 
between 1969 and 1975 when average human wealth falls from $28,440 to 
$7,340. By  1979 female singles have a higher median wealth than males, 
although a lower mean wealth. This, of  course, is just another reflection 
of the somewhat more compact wealth distribution of single women. By 
1979 it would seem that a substantial fraction of the RHS population, 
whose ages range from sixty-eight to seventy-four years at that time, are 
reasonably well-off financially. This is particularly true for couples where 
the top half has more than $170,707 in wealth and the top 10 percent more 
than $357,247. 
Table 5.10 also shows that the real nonhuman wealth position of  each 
family type improves over time for the entire wealth distribution. That is, 
not only does median real wealth of couples increase, but the five percent- 
age and ninety-five percentage points of the distribution increase in real 
terms. The same is true of the wealth distributions of single males and sin- 
gle females.  Considering  the shorter life expectancy required  to be  fi- 
nanced  by  nonhuman assets, it appears that people in all parts of the 
wealth distribution gain between 1969 and 1975 and between 1975 and 
1979. 
Table 5.1  1 shows median nonhuman wealth by age for 1969, 1975, and 
1979 for the entire sample and particular subsamples. The numbers are 
weakly supportive of the life-cycle theory. First, notice that wealth gener- 
ally increases with age in 1969, where the oldest are closest to retirement, 
and decreases with age in 1979, where almost all are retired but the oldest 
have lower wealth. This effect in 1979 is partly or perhaps solely due to the 
reduced annuity value of Social Security, other transfers, and private pen- 
sions for the older members of  the cohort because of their shorter ex- 
pected remaining life. Nonetheless, this is the pattern the life-cycle theory 
predicts. Also consistent is the fact that the youngest members of each co- 
hort had the largest real wealth gain between 1969 and 1975 and also be- 
tween 1975 and 1979. This is partly due to the fact that they were more 
likely to be working during this period and hence more likely to benefit 
from the double indexing of Social Security. 
Table 5.12 provides information regarding the correlation of income 
and wealth for each of  the three years. The numbers shown are cross- 
tabulations of income and wealth quartiles in absolute frequencies; for ex- 
ample, the upper-left-hand-corner number indicates that 18.3 percent of 'hble 5.11  Medh  Nonhuman Wealth by Age and Marital Status 





























































































































60,050 147  Inflation Vulnerability,  Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
Table 5.12  Cross-Tabulation  of  Income Quartiles by Total Wealth Qunrtiles, 
1969,1975,1979  RHS  Sample 
Income Quartiles 
Wealth 
Quartiles  0-25%  25-50%  50-75%  75-100% 
1969 
0-25%  18.3  6.2  0.5  0.1 
25-50%  3.9  13.6  6.8  0.7 
50-75%  2.2  3.6  13.0  6.0 
75-100%  0.6  1.4  4.7  18.2 
1975 
0-25%  18.8  5.2  0.8  0.2 
25-50%  5.0  13.5  5.4  1.1 
50-75%  0.9  5.4  13.5  5.3 
75-100%  0.3  1  .o  5.4  18.4 
1979 
0-25%  19.2  5.2  0.5  0.1 
25-50%  4.8  14.0  5.6  0.7 
50-75%  0.9  5.2  14.0  5.0 
75-100%  0.2  0.6  5.0  19.3 
Note: Entries are percentage of  total population in each cell. 
the population in 1969 is in both the lower-income and -wealth quartile. 
Another way of saying the same thing is that 73.2 (or four times 18.3) per- 
cent of those in the lowest-income quartile are also in the lowest-wealth 
quartile. One can see from the tables that income is a good predictor of 
wealth at the extremes. That is, those with high income are likely to have 
high wealth, and those with low incomes, low wealth. The off-diagonal 
corners are almost nonexistent; for example, almost no one in the top in- 
come quartile is in the bottom wealth quartile. The concentration along 
the diagonal is  high (63.1 percent in  1969 are in the same income and 
wealth quartiles, 64.2 in 1975, and 66.5 in 1979) and increases with time. 
The reason that income becomes a better proxy for wealth is that nonpay- 
ing retirement assets are fewer in 1979 and labor force participation has 
greatly declined. 
We  next investigate the vulnerability of the wealth position of the el- 
derly to unanticipated changes in the price level and the inflation rate. As 
we mentioned in the introduction, the elderly may be particularly harmed 
by inflation because of  their inflexibility in not being able to work. Fur- 
ther, a common and lasting impression is that the elderly often have to 
make do on fixed nominal incomes. To investigate the inflation vulner- 
ability of  the RHS population,  we  have constructed a number of  mea- 148  Michael D. Hurd/John B.  Shoven 
sures. All of them classify assets and liabilities into three categories: those 
that offer a real or indexed return and are therefore protected from unan- 
ticipated price changes or inflation; those that offer fixed nominal returns 
and hence whose real value is reduced by inflation; and those whose real 
values increase (or real liabilities decrease) with inflation. Our basic classi- 
fication is shown in table 5.13, although we do investigate the vulnerabil- 
ity of the wealth of the elderly when common stocks and even Social Secu- 
rity are fixed nominal assets. If  someone has a nominal asset and prices 
take an unexpected and once-and-for-all 1 percent jump, the real value of 
that asset will be  1 percent lower. However, the effect of  a  1 percent 
change in inflation and nominal interest rates (via a Fisher effect) on real 
wealth values depends on the maturity of the nominal asset. A long-term 
bond may easily and immediately lose 6 to 8 percent of its value if interest 
rates climb 1 percent. In table 5.13 we list the sensitivity of the value of 
nominal assets and liabilities to an unexpected 1 percent change in the 
long-term nominal interest rate. The numbers differ by year because of 
differences in the base interest rate and the duration of the assets. For ex- 
ample, private pensions become a shorter asset with the passage of time as 
remaining life expectancy falls. Table 5.13 indicates that in 1969, a 1 per- 
cent increase in the nominal interest rate would have reduced the value of 
a nominal pension claim for the RHS  population by 9.4 percent. This sen- 
sitivity to nominal interest rates is only 4.2 percent by 1979. A detailed ex- 
planation of table 5.13 is given in the fourth section, “Calculation of In- 
flation vulnerability,” of the appendix. 
Our first measure of vulnerability (  Vl) measures the percentage loss in 
real wealth per percentage of unanticipated increase in the price level. It is 
simply defined as nominal assets less nominal liabilities (the sum of cate- 
gory B entries in table 5.13 less those in category C) divided by total non- 
human capital net worth. The idea is that the real value of nominal assets 
and liabilities declines point for point with unanticipated jumps in the 
price level. A  V,  value of  zero would mean that the household is com- 
pletely protected against price level jumps, whereas an index of one would 
indicate that the household’s real wealth declines 1 percent for each 1 per- 
cent rise in the price level.  Vz,  our second measure, differs only in that it 
treats common stocks as nominal assets and, therefore, places them in 
category B. Theoretically, stocks represent a claim to the income flows of 
real capital, and unanticipated increases in the price level should increase 
their real value to the extent the company is leveraged. That is, it is the 
stockholders who should gain at the expense of the bondholders. The per- 
formance of the U.S. stock market in the past seventeen years is such that 
one would not want to carry this argument too far, and hence the calcula- 
tionof V,. 
The third measure,  V3,  differs from the first two in that it attempts to 
measure the sensitivity of the wealth position of the elderly to an unex- 149  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
Table 5.W  Ineation Vulnerability of Assets and Lmbilities 
A.  Protected from Price Level Shocks and Inflation 
Social Security 
Medicare-Medicaid 
Transfer payment benefits 
Housesa 
Other physical assets 
Common stocksb 
B.  Vulnerable to Price Changes and Inflation (Financial Assets) 
Price Sensitivity to Inflation Change 
1969  1975  1979 





3.5  2.4  3.4 
8.0  6.1  5.9 
9.4  5.0  4.2 
1 .o  1 .o  1  .O 
1 .o  1  .O  1  .O 
C.  Gain from Price Changes and Inflation (Financial Liabilities) 
Price Sensitivity to Inflation Change 
1969  1975  1979 
Mortgage liabilities  6.4  6.1  4.2 
Other debts  2.5  2.5  2.5 
aThere is a theoretical reason for thinking that houses are overindexed-the  value of 
houses will rise faster than inflation due to their tax treatment. Thus, our vulnerability 
measures may overstate true vulnerability. 
bWe examine some inflation vulnerability statistics where common stocks are considered 
in class B, i.e., vulnerable to unexpected price changes. 
pected increase in the inflation rate and the long-term nominal interest 
rates. We assume a strict point-for-point Fisher effect. The difference be- 
tween this vulnerability and VI and VZ  is that for V3  the maturity of assets is 
important. For example, a 1 percent price level increase would depress the 
real value of a consol by 1 percent. However, a 1 percent increase in infla- 
tion that drove interest rates from 7 to 8 percent would immediately re- 
duce the value of a consol by  12.5 percent. We attempt to calculate in V3 
the immediate fall in real wealth as a fraction of  total nonhuman wealth 
for an unexpected one point increase in inflation. 
The vulnerability of assets listed in table 5.13 to price level shocks is 
zero for those in category A, plus one for those in category B, and minus 
one for category C. Their vulnerability to inflation rate shocks is again 
zero for assets in category A, the numbers shown in the table for category 
B, and minus the numbers shown for category C. The vulnerability of a 150  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
portfolio is the weighted average of the vulnerability of the assets in the 
portfolio where the weights are the relative importance of the assets. Vul- 
nerability will be low if either assets in category A are relatively large or if 
those in category C offset those in category B. 
Table 5.14 displays the median vulnerability figures for the three mea- 
sures with respect to three different wealth bases. Each measure is the ra- 
tio of the loss in real wealth caused by a 1 percent change in price level (V, 
and VZ)  or inflation (V3) to a particular wealth measure (total nonhuman 
wealth, nonhuman,  non-Social  Security wealth, and nonhuman, non- 
transfer wealth). We also calculate what the price and inflation vulnerabil- 
ity of the nonhuman wealth of the elderly would be if Social Security were 
not indexed. This presumes that households would not adjust their port- 
folios to such a change in regimes. If the government simply announced 
that Social Security were no longer indexed, the possibilities for the exist- 
ing elderly to alter greatly their wealth portfolio is probably limited, so 
our assumption may not be too far off the mark. 
Concentrating first on the vulnerability of total nonhuman wealth (the 
first set of measures in table 5.14), we see that median vulnerability is low 
by all measures. For example, both  Vl  and  V3  measure .034 for 1969, 
meaning that a 1 percent inflation or price shock would reduce real wealth 
only 0.34 percent. Vz,  which treats the stock market as vulnerable to price 
shocks, still only has a median value of .042. The measures’ increase over 
time may be due to the decrease in mortgage liabilities in the population. 
Among singles, men are more vulnerable than women. This is due to the 
higher private pension wealth of men and their lower Social Security and 
Medicare-Medicaid wealth figures. The vulnerability measures are, thus, 
consistent with the wealth composition figures of tables 5.6-5.8.  The me- 
dian vulnerability within the lowest 10 percent wealth tail is zero, while the 
richest 10 percent of the RHS population is far more vulnerable than aver- 
age. The poor simply have zero or trivial nominal financial assets. They 
have nothing to lose. The rich, on the other hand, hold bonds and have 
substantial pension wealth, both of which make them more vulnerable to 
price or inflation shocks. Even for the wealthy, the vulnerability medians 
are not large: a 10 percent jump in prices would cause them to  lose 1.1 per- 
cent in real wealth in 1969, and a 10 percent permanent increase in the rate 
of inflation would cause them to lose 3.2 percent of their wealth in 1969. 
All the numbers in the first part of the table lead us to conclude that the 
popular notion of inflation vulnerability of the elderly is wrong: the el- 
derly do not live on fixed incomes derived from assets that depreciate 
when inflation increases. Rather, a substantial fraction of the elderly have 
an index of  inflation vulnerability that is so low that inflation has no ap- 
preciable effect on their wealth. To the extent that the elderly are vulner- 
able, the vulnerability is concentrated in the class that is of least social 
concern-the  wealthy elderly. Of course, these statistics do not imply that Table 5.14  Measures of Vulnerability of  Wealth to Inflation of RHS Sample (medians) 
Single  Wealth Tails 
All 
Households  Couples  Singles  Male  Female  10%  90% 
A.  Vulnerability of Total Nonhuman Wealth 
v,  1969 
1975 
1979 
V2  1969 
1975 
1979 
















































.Ooo  .I10 
.Ooo  .130 
.Ooo  .120 
.Ooo  .160 
.Ooo  .2oo 
.Ooo  ,210 
.Ooo  .320 
.Ooo  .230 
.Ooo  .230 
B.  Vulnerability of Non-Social Security, Nonhuman Wealth 
V,  1969 
1975 
1979 
V*  1969 
1975 
1979 
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.Ooo  .160 
.Ooo  .250 
.ooo  .190 
.Ooo  .250 
.Ooo  .280 
.Ooo  .360 
.Ooo  .280 
.Ooo  .350 lhble 5.14 (continued) 
Single  Wealth Tails 
All 
Households  Couples  Singles  Male  Female  10%  90% 










































































D. Vulnerability of Total Nonhuman Wealth 
with Social Security Treated Like a Nonindexed Pension Annuity 
V,  1%9 
1975 
1979 
V2  1969 
1975 
1979 
















































.490  .230 
,530  .300 
.450  .310 
.490  ,300 
S30  .390 
.460  .390 
4.52  1.41 
2.56  1.08 
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the poor elderly are well-off: to the contrary, as we have seen, the lowest 
10 percent of the wealth distribution has very little wealth. The statistics 
simply show that they are not made worse off by price or inflation shocks. 
The second part of the table answers the question What would inflation 
vulnerability be if there were no Social Security wealth, yet everything else 
were the same? The price shock index, Vl,  is about 60 percent higher with 
no Social Security wealth because Social Security significantly increases 
wealth, and it is inflation protected. The differential is greater for females 
than for males; it is small for the wealthy in 1969. V3  changes in about the 
same way as V,  in going from part A to part B of table 5.14. One interest- 
ing finding is that by 1979 excluding Social Security wealth, as was done 
for part B, causes Vl and V3  to increase substantially for the wealthy. This 
happens because the importance of Social Security in the portfolios of the 
wealthy increases between 1969 and 1979: in 1969 Social Security is about 
8 percent of the wealth of those in the upper 10 percent tail of the wealth 
distribution; by 1979 it accounts for about 13 percent of their wealth. 
Part C of table 5.14 gives the inflation vulnerability indexes over private 
wealth, that is, SSI, welfare, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security 
wealth are excluded. A comparison of parts A and C shows that the gov- 
ernment programs are very important in reducing vulnerability: overall 
household price shock vulnerability, Vl in 1969 changes from .034 to .087. 
Over some groups the changes are much greater: Vl of single males in 1975 
changes from .057 to .245. The changes in inflation vulnerability, V3,  are 
even greater. For example, for all households in 1975  V3  changes from 
.063 to .224; for single males, it goes from .056 to .325. We conclude that 
the government programs included in our wealth calculation, all of which 
are roughly inflation protected, make an important contribution to pro- 
tecting the elderly from inflation. 
The last part of table 5.14 gives the vulnerability measures when Social 
Security is not indexed. Thus, Social Security is treated like the usual pri- 
vate sector annuity. The changes in the indexes are large and make the el- 
derly at the median substantially vulnerable to inflation. For example, Vl 
in 1969 changes from .034 to .447; with Social Security indexed, a price 
jump would have caused a trivial change in real wealth; without indexing 
of Social Security, a 1 percent price jump causes almost a 0.5 percent loss 
in real wealth. Even more startling are the changes in V3:  with indexed So- 
cial Security, inflation rate changes are not a serious problem at the me- 
dian; without indexing a 1 percent change in the inflation rate would have 
caused in 1969 a 3.7 percent drop in real wealth at the median. But per- 
haps the most important finding is what the change would do to the poor 
elderly. It would change them from a group that at the median is com- 
pletely insulated from inflation shocks to one that is highly vulnerable. In 
1969 their V3  changes from zero to 4.52 when Social Security  is taken to be 
not indexed. This means, of course, that the household with the median 154  Michael D. Hurd/John B.  Shoven 
vulnerability among the poor would suffer nearly a 23 percent loss in real 
wealth if inflation and interest rates unexpectedly increased 5 percent. 
The wealthy elderly also gain from indexing Social Security, but the 
gain in inflation protection is not nearly as great as the gain of the poor el- 
derly. We conclude, therefore, that indexing Social Security has been an 
important tool in protecting the poor elderly from inflation, and without 
its protection they would have suffered considerable wealth losses in the 
inflation of the 1970s. 
Part D of the table also shows that the importance of indexing Social 
Security declines with time. This is because the RHS population is aging, 
so the impoqtance of Social Security in their wealth portfolios declines as 
life expectancy decreases. Also, since Social Security is a shorter asset, it is 
less vulnerable to inflation shocks even if it is unindexed. Nevertheless, 
even by 1979 when the RHS population is sixty-eight to seventy-four years 
of age, our elderly sample would have substantial inflation risk without 
the indexing of Social Security. For example, the median person would 
lose about 1.7 percent of his real wealth if the inflation rate permanently 
and unexpectedly increased by 1 perceRt. 
Our overall conclusion from this table is that as a group the elderly are 
not especially vulnerable to either price jumps or increases in the rate of 
inflation. At the median, the poor elderly are completely unaffected by in- 
flation; the wealthy are somewhat vulnerable, but from a social policy 
point of view that vulnerability may not be important. The impression 
one has from the popular press and from casual observation is that the el- 
derly suffer greater wealth losses than the young when inflation increases. 
In fact, if there are no real wealth consequences of increases in inflation 
and only distributional consequences, a loss by the elderly would be a gain 
by the young. Our findings indicate that although some elderly may gain 
and some may lose through inflation, as a group the losses are slight. 
Thus, inflation does not cause any substantial transfer of wealth from the 
elderly to  the young, and the popular impression is false. 
We have alluded to  the fact that some elderly may actually gain when an 
increase occurs in the inflation rate. This can happen to people whose as- 
sets are inflation protected but whose liabilities are nominal with a long 
maturity. Home mortgages are a good example of the latter. In table 5.15 
we give the distributions of  Vl and V3  by age and year in two situations: 
when all nonhuman wealth is included and when Social Security is treated 
like a nominal annuity. The two sets of distributions correspond, there- 
fore, to parts A and D of table 5.14. 
We see that in 1969, 5 percent of the fifty-eight-year-olds have a V1  in- 
dex less than -  .24. That is, among fifty-eight-year-olds in 1969, a 1 per- 
cent increase in the price level would cause at least a .24 percent gain in 
real wealth in 5 percent of that population. At the upper end, 5 percent of 
that same group would have at least a .43 percent loss in real wealth in re- 155  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
sponse to a 1 percent jump in the price level. This seems to us to be a sub- 
stantial spread in the distribution of  inflation vulnerabilities. For exam- 
ple, as reported in table 5.14, the median of  VI in the upper-wealth tail is 
.l  1 ,  which is much smaller than ninetieth percentile point of  about .32. 
This means that many people who are not in the upper-wealth tail still 
have high-inflation vulnerability. One may conclude from table 5.14 that 
as a group the elderly are not particularly vulnerable to inflation, but table 
5.15 shows that there is a wide spread in the vulnerability, and that some 
individuals have considerable inflation vulnerability. 
The distribution seems to become more compact as people age. For ex- 
ample, in 1969 the 5 percent point rises from -  .24 at age fifty-eight to 
-  .16 at age sixty-four; yet the 95 percent point falls as age increases. This 
is probably caused by a decrease in the fraction of the RHS population 
with mortgage liabilities: people holding mortgages tend to be in the lower 
part of the vulnerability distribution in 1969, whereas people in the upper 
part of the distribution are not mortgage holders. Thus, when mortgages 
decrease, the lower part of  the distribution changes, but the upper re- 
mains the same. 
It is hard to see any time trend in the distribution. We can roughly check 
this by comparing the index of sixty-four-year-olds in 1969 with the index 
of sixty-four-year-olds in  1975. These are, of  course, different cohorts. 
Similarly, we can compare sixty-eight-, sixty-nine-, and seventy-year-olds 
in 1975 and 1979. Such a comparison gives little evidence of  a change in 
the distribution over time. For example, the 10  percent points of sixty- 
four-year-olds in 1969 and 1975 are -  .07 and -  .05 respectively. The 10 
percent point of  sixty-eight-year-olds is -  .02 in both 1975 and 1979. Our 
overall reading of these and other comparisons is that little change occurs 
in the distribution of  Vl over time, holding age constant. 
The distribution of  V3  is even more wide spread than the distribution of 
V,.  For example, the 5  percent point in 1969 of  fifty-eight-year-olds is 
-  1.42, and the 95  percent point is 3.26. Thus 5 percent of that group 
gains at least 1.42 percent of their wealth for an increase in the inflation 
rate of 1 percent, yet 5 percent of the group loses at least 3.26 percent of its 
wealth for each 1 percent jump in the inflation rate. These are much big- 
ger variations in the vulnerability index than we found across the groups 
given in table 5.14. The impression is that although at the median the RHS 
population in 1969 is not especially vulnerable to jumps in the inflation 
rate, substantial numbers of people gained or lost significant fractions of 
their wealth in the inflation of the 1970s. 
As with Vl, aging seems to make the V3  distribution more compact: the 5 
percent point rises and the 95 percent point falls in 1969 as age increases. 
An interesting finding that does not appear in the distribution of VI is the 
large decrease in the 95 percent point over time: its average over all the age 
groups declines from about 2.95 in 1969 to about .85 in 1979, yet the medi- 156  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
ans remain roughly the same. It is not easy to say what caused this change 
because we do  not have the distribution of the composition of wealth. One 
might speculate that the high inflation of the 1970s induced people who 
were particularly vulnerable to inflation rate increases to change their 
portfolio composition to gain some inflation protection. 
The large decline in the 95 percent point is symptomatic of the compact- 
ing of the distribution of v3 over time, holding age constant. Again, mak- 
ing the same kind of comparisons that were outlined for V,,  we find, hold- 
ing age constant, a tighter distribution. For example, the 10 percent points 
of sixty-four-year-olds  in 1969 and 1975 are -  1.51 and -  .42 respectively; 
the 90  percent points are 1.48 and .70. 
The second part of table 5.15 gives the distributions of  VI and V3  when 
Social Security is treated like a nominal annuity. A comparison with the 
first part of the table shows that for VI the whole distribution is shifted to 
the right and substantial numbers of people are highly vulnerable to price 
jumps. For example, about 10 percent of the people in each year have V1 
indexes above .70. Their losses would be at least 70 cents for each dollar or 
price jump. There does not seem to be a time trend in the shape of the dis- 
tribution, nor any systematic variation in the distribution by age. 
The distribution of V3  under nominal Social Security shows the impor- 
tance of indexing Social Security in protecting some of the elderly from in- 
flation. In 1969 fully 25 percent of the RHS population have a V3  index of 
more than five. Permanent increases in the rate of inflation would have 
wiped out substantial fractions of their wealth. For example, if  we take 
the inflation rate of 1968,4.7 percent, to be the initial permanent rate, this 
group would have lost about 37 percent of its real wealth with the inflation 
that occurred  in the  1970s.  With nominal Social Security, this group 
would conform to the popular stereotype of an inflation-vulnerable el- 
derly population. The V3  distribution becomes somewhat more compact 
over time, due in large part to the fall in the upper 5 percent point. That 
fall is mainly caused by the declining importance of annuities in the port- 
folios. 
We conclude from the distributions given in table 5.15 that there is great 
variation in the elderly’s vulnerability to price jumps and inflation in- 
creases. Substantial numbers of the RHS are completely  protected or even 
gain from inflation, while substantial numbers are hurt. If Social Security 
were not indexed, the distribution would be much wider and many elderly 
would be badly hurt by inflation increases. Indexing seems both to protect 
the elderly as a group and to reduce the variation in the risk. 
5.4  Conclusion 
Our overall impression from the RHS data is that as a group the elderly 
maintained their economic position quite well during the 1970s. Their in- Table 5.15  Vulnerability of Nonhuman Wealth for 1969,1975,  and 1979 
A.  Total Nonhuman Wealth, Distribution by V1 
Percentile 
Points 
Age in 1969 
58  59  60  61  62  63  64 
5%  1969 
1975 
1979 
10  1969 
1975 
1979 
25  1969 
1975 
1979 
50  1969 
1975 
1979 
75  1%9 
1975 
1979 
90  1969 
1975 
1979 
-  .24 
-  .ll 
-  .08 
-  .13 
-  .05 
-  .02 












-  .22 
-  .16 
-  .08 
-  .13 
-  .06 
-  .02 












-  .22 
-.11 
-  .05 
-.13 
-  .04 
-  .01 












-  .21 
-  .09 
-  .05 
-.11 
-  .02 
-  .01 













-  .07 
-  .05 
-  .08 
-  .02 
-  .01 












-  .15 
-  .05 
-  .02 
-  .07 
-  .01 













-  .16 
-  .08 
-  .03 
-  .07 
-  .02 













95  1969  .43  .41  .42  .41  .42  .42  .40 
1975  .40  .35  .40  .36  .36  .40  .40 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 C.  Social Security Treated as a Nonindexed Pension Annuity, Distribution by V, 
Percentile 
Points 
Age in 1969 
5%  1969 
1975 
1979 
10  1969 
1975 
1979 
25  1969 
1975 
1979 
50  1969 
1975 
1979 
75  1969 
1975 
1979 
90  1969 
1975 
1979 
95  1969 
1975 
1979 





















.  .01  .oo 
.oo  .06 
.03  .09 
.05  .10 
.12  .18 
.13  .20 
.21  .25 
.31  .35 
.31  .35 
.41  .45 
.50  .54 
.48  .49 
.58  .60 
.63  .66 
.59  .60 
.70  .70 
.72  .74 
.69  .68 
.76  .75 
.76  .78 
.73  .73 
.  00  .  00 
.01  .07 
.05  .06 
.08  .I2 
.17  .21 
.16  ,123 
.26  .27 
.34  .36 
.32  .32 
.45  .47 
.52  .53 
.47  .47 
.60  .62 
.65  .65 
.59  .60 
.71  .72 
.73  .75 
.68  .70 
.76  .77 
.79  .79 










































.75 Table 5.15  (continued) 
D.  Social Security Treated as a Nonindexed Pension Annuity, Distribution by V3 
Percentile 
Points 
Age in 1969 
58  59  60  61  62  63  64 
5%  1969 
1975 
1979 
10  1%9 
1975 
1979 
25  1969 
1975 
1979 
50  1969 
1975 
1979 
75  1969 
1975 
1979 
90  1969 
1975 
1979 
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comes held  up in the face of  growing inflation,  and their  nonhuman 
wealth actually increased slightly in real terms. Furthermore, their portfo- 
lios were such that at the median they were substantially protected from 
inflation. We found that government programs can take credit for much 
of the inflation protection in the sense that private wealth is much more 
inflation vulnerable than the sum of  private and public wealth. Indexing 
Social Security is largely responsible for this fact in that if  Social Security 
were not indexed, the elderly would be highly vulnerable to inflation. This 
is especially true of the poor elderly, a group that under indexing is, at the 
median, completely protected from inflation; without indexing, the poor 
elderly would lose large fractions of their small wealth, were the rate of in- 
flation to rise. They would change from being the least vulnerable group 
among the elderly, to being the most vulnerable. We also found, however, 
from our study of  the distributions of income, wealth, and inflation vul- 
nerability, that to speak of the median or mean of the elderly obscures the 
wide diversity of economic positions among them. Many elderly are well- 
off with adequate holdings of private wealth augmented with Social Secu- 
rity and Medicare, while at the same time many elderly have almost no 
wealth beyond that supplied by government programs. Similarly, the me- 
dian elderly person is not particularly vulnerable to inflation, yet many el- 
derly actually gain from increases in the rate of inflation, and many others 
lose significant amounts. The findings that the elderly's wealth positions 
were not harmed during the 1970s and that they were not particularly vul- 
nerable to inflation are not, of' course, independent findings. Rather, they 
complement each other and ought to increase our confidence that both 
findings are correct. 
Appendix 
Description of the Data 
The Retirement History Survey (RHS) is a national longitudinal survey 
of  11,153 households whose heads were born in 1906 through 191 1. The 
surviving households were reinterviewed every two years through  1979. 
Detailed data on financial characteristics, work behavior, and health were 
obtained. The file is especially useful for this study because the RHS data 
were matched to Social Security earnings records, which give contribu- 
tions to Social Security throughout the working life through 1974. There- 
fore, it is possible to calculate exactly the Social Security benefits a worker 
would receive were he to retire in 1975 or before. We construct from the 
RHS the earnings records for 1975 through 1979, so that Social Security 
benefits can be calculated for workers not yet retired by 1975. 162  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
For a variety of reasons, missing values occurred on the data tape. If we 
had eliminated households on the basis of missing values, the resulting 
sample would have been small because of the large number of components 
of income and wealth. Therefore, we imputed missing values after care- 
fully examining the raw data. Where an item was missing in the particular 
wave of the RHS, its value was imputed if possible from the previous wave 
of the RHS by multiplying the answer given for the same item by the same 
respondent from the previous wave by the growth rate in the median value 
of such assets for all nonmissing respondents between the previous wave 
of the RHS and the particular wave. Imputation used the latest wave of 
the RHS that had a valid value, but could reach as far back as the 1969 
(first) wave or as far forward as 1979. If a datum could not be imputed by 
reference to the same question in another year for the same respondent, 
the datum was set equal to the median of all nonmissing answers for other 
respondents in the particular wave. 
The raw data yielded fifty-two data items for each year. Several of these 
items are aggregates of even more finely defined variables. For 1971 ,  1973, 
1975,  1977, and 1979, a list of fifty-two corresponding completion codes 

























Market value of house 
Outstanding mortgage debt on house 
Other debt on house 
Market value of farm 
Outstanding mortgage debt on farm 
Other debt on farm 
Market value of business 
Business debt 
Market value of other real property 
Outstanding mortgage debt on other real property 
Other debt on other real property 
Market value of motor vehicles 
Debt on motor vehicles 
Face value of U.S. savings bonds 
Value of U.S. corporate stocks and bonds 
Value of loans owned by respondent 
Money in checking accounts 
Money in savings accounts 
Face value of life insurance 
Face value of annuities 
Medical bills outstanding 
Store debts outstanding 
Outstanding debts to banks and savings institutions 





























Actual annual pension income, railroad retirement 
Actual annual pension income, military service 
Actual annual pension income, government employment 
Actual annual pension income, private employment 
Annual income from SSI program 
Annual benefits from AFDC program 
Annual benefits from other public assistance programs 
Annual state cash sickness benefits 
Annual workmen’s compensation benefits 
Annual benefits from unemployment insurance 
Annual income from private insurance and annuities 
Annual benefits from private welfare agencies 
Annual benefits from disability programs, other than Social Security 
Annual income from relatives 
Annual income from other private individuals outside the household 
Annual interest income from stocks, bonds, dividends, and savings 
Annual rental income 
Annual income from Social Security 
Expected annual income from AFDC 
Expected annual pension income, railroad retirement 
Expected annual pension income, military service 
Expected annual pension income, government employment 
Expected annual interest income 
Expected annual income from private insurance and annuities 
Expected annual rental income 
Expected annual income from relatives 
Expected annual income from other private individuals outside the 
household 
Expected annual income from other public assistance programs. 
After each of the fifty-two data items are imputed (this process is re- 
peated for the survey years 1969, 1975, and 1979), a vector of incomes and 
a vector of wealth components are created.  Responses to questions re- 
garding  flows  are capitalized  to yield  wealth  figures if  corresponding 
wealth data were not available. Where possible, expected rather than ac- 
tual flows were capitalized to yield wealth. Incomes were obtained directly 
from the RHS questions if possible. Otherwise, corresponding wealth fig- 
ures were converted to  flows by assuming a 3 percent service flow from the 
stock figure. Items that are capitalized to  create wealth stocks are capital- 
ized at either a nominal interest rate (nominal rate = 6 percent in 1969, 
7.5 percent in 1975, and 9.5 percent in 1979) or a real rate of 3 percent de- 
pending on the particular income. Flows that were not expected to grow 
with inflation were capitalized at the nominal rate, while flows that were 
expected to grow (such as income from government programs) were cap- 164  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoveu 
italized at the real rate. Flows were capitalized for a term consisting of the 
expected value of the life expectancy (assuming person is midway between 
birthdays) of the respondent or his spouse (if present, and greater than re- 
spondent’s), depending upon whether the income flow was assumed to 
continue to the spouse after the death of the respondent. The assumptions 
on length of flow were: 
Railroad pension-respondent  ’s life expectancy 
Military pension-respondent’s  life expectancy 
Government pension-respondent  ’s life expectancy 
Private pension-respondent’s  life expectancy 
Income from SSI-maximum  of respondent’s or spouse’s life expectancy 
Benefits from AFDC-three  years only, or respondent’s life expectancy if 
Benefits  from other  public  assistance-maximum  of  respondent’s  or 
Income from private insurance and annuities-maximum  of respondent’s 
Benefits  from private welfare agencies-maximum  of  respondent’s or 
Benefits  from non-Social  Security disability-respondent’s  life expec- 
Income from relatives-maximum  of respondent’s or spouse’s life expec- 
Income from other private persons outside household-maximum  of re- 
less 
spouse’s life expectancy 
or spouse’s life expectancy 
spouse’s  life expectancy 
tancy 
tancy 
spondent’s or spouse’s life expectancy. 
A capitalized value of Medicare and Medicaid payments is computed by 
applying the average per person benefits to the life expectancy (appropri- 
ately discounted) of the respondent, plus benefits over the life expectancy 
of respondent’s spouse, if married. For survey year 1969, the mean 1975 
Medicare-Medicaid value was used, adjusted by change in price index be- 
tween 1968 and 1975. The figures were obtained from the 1981 Social Se- 
curity annual statistical supplement. Of course, actual payments will vary 
from individual to individual, and the insurance value will vary somewhat 
from state to state. Furthermore, the utility value to someone in a pay- 
ment-in-kind program is overstated by the cash value of the program. Our 
numbers, therefore, overstate the actual insurance value, and they do not 
capture the variation from individual to individual. 
In computing income for the sample, we took a broad view of the com- 
ponents of income. In addition to such conventional income sources as 
Social Security, wage, rent, interest, pensions, government transfers, an- 
nuities, and contributions from relatives, we imputed income from own- 
er-occupied housing and Medicare-Medicaid. 165  Inflation Vulnerability,  Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
The imputations and conversion  of  stocks to flows and the reverse 
where necessary produced the basic data used in the analysis. These varia- 
bles are: 
1. House services 
2. Mortgage service 
3. Other debt on house service 
4. Farm services 
5. Mortgage on farm service 
6. Other debt on farm service 
7. Business services 
8. Debt on business service 
9. Other real property services 
10. Other real property mortgage service 
11. Other real property debt service 
12. Car services 
13. Car debt service 
14.  Interest income 
15. Income from life insurance and annuities 
16. Medical bills service 
17.  Store debt service 
18. Bank debt service 
19. Private debt service 
20.  Rental income (this actually should be ignored, as rental income is al- 
21.  Pension income, railroad retirement 
22.  Pension income, military 
23.  Pension income, government 
24.  Pension income, private 
25.  Income from relatives 
26. State cash sickness benefits 
27.  Workmen’s compensation 
28.  Unemployment insurance 
29.  SSI 
30.  AFDC 
3 1.  Income from other public assistance (non-AFDC) 
32.  Income from non-Social Security disability 
33.  Income from private welfare 
34.  Income from other private individuals 
35.  Medicare-Medicaid 
36.  Income from Social Security (from RHS) 
37.  Wage income (computed in phase 1 and phase 2) 
38.  Market value of house 
39.  Mortgage on house 





























Other debt on house 
Market value of farm 
Mortgage on farm 
Other debt on farm 
Market value of business 
Debt on business 
Market value of real property 
Mortgage on real property 
Other debt on real property 
Market value of motor vehicles 
Debt on motor vehicles 
U.S. savings bonds, face value 




Life insurance, face value 
Annuities, face value 
Medical bills 
Store debts 
Debts to banks 
Debts to private individuals 
Rental wealth (should ignore) 
Pension wealth, railroad 
Pension wealth, military 
Pension wealth, government 
Pension wealth, private 
Wealth from relatives 
Variables 68 through  70 are not  capitalized.  It  is  assumed that the 
household only received these benefits for the year prior to the evaluation 













Wealth from state cash sickness benefits 
Wealth from workmen’s compensation 
Wealth from unemployment insurance 
Wealth from SSI 
Wealth from AFDC 
Wealth, other public assistance 
Wealth, non-Social Security disability 
Wealth, private welfare 
Wealth, from other source (private individuals) 
Wealth, Medicare-Medicaid 
Wealth, Social Security 
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Calculation of Social Security Variables 
The input data set is a matched file of responses to the 1969,1971,1973, 
1975, 1977, and 1979 Retirement History Surveys, plus matched Social 
Security Administration earnings records through 1974. From these data 
we calculate Social Security benefits were the worker to retire; Social Se- 
curity wealth-the  expected present value of benefits were the worker to 
retire; and Social Security taxes-the  present value of taxes paid in with 
an adjustment for probabilities of death. For most observations the calcu- 
lations, while not routine, are reasonably straightforward. Here we mainly 
concentrate our discussion on the difficulties that arise due to the com- 
plexity of the law and peculiarities of the data. In particular, the treatment 
of widows is very complicated. 
Because of differences between SSA earnings record year-of-birth in- 
formation and year-of-birth derived from age in the 1969 RHS, the year- 
of-birth derived from RHS was used in the computation of Social Security 
wealth. Using the SSA earnings record year-of-birth would make some re- 
spondents as old as seventy years at the time of the RHS survey. 
The Social Security Primary Insurance Account (PIA) is calculated for 
each person based on his earnings record, using the law in effect on 1 Jan- 
uary of a particular year (the evaluation year) and assuming the individual 
retires as soon as possible (age sixty-two or as soon as sufficient quarters 
of covered employment are accumulated after age sixty-two for those not 
yet eligible by age sixty-two). If an individual’s PIA is based on average 
monthly wage; if the year is later than 1970, then an individual who delays 
retirement past age sixty-five receives a bonus of  1  percent per year for 
each year of delayed retirement past age sixty-five. However, if  PIA is 
based on either of  the other methods (covered-years method or method 
using pre-1950 income), then no bonus is received for delayed retirement. 
Also, the bonus stops at age seventy-two. (See U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services 1981, p. 19.) If an individual retires before reaching 
age sixty-five, PIA is reduced for early retirement. 
We  assumed that for married couples, the male’s Social Security wealth 
is always simply based on his own PIA computed from his own earnings 
record. The female’s Social Security wealth is taken as the maximum of 
her own PIA or her spouse or widow’s benefit based on her husband’s 
PIA. She is allowed to switch from her own benefit to her spouse or wid- 
ow’s benefit over time, or from spouse or death benefit to her own benefit. 
Single men and women have a Social Security wealth based on their own 
PIA only. 
If the original 1969 respondent was a widow (and has not remarried by 
the evaluation year), then we calculate her benefits in a special way. The 
Social Security Administration Earnings file contains no information on 
the widow’s deceased husband, so we utilize data from the RHS to obtain 
widows’ benefits. If the widow has remarried since the 1969 survey year, 168  Michael D. Hurd/John B.  Shoven 
she is treated the same as other married women (her new husband should 
have SSA records). If an  original 1969 widow is still a widow in the evalua- 
tion year, then we  calculate widows’ benefits using information  from 
RHS. We perform the calculation only if she has good tax records from 
the SSA file. We take the view that if a widow is found to receive Social Se- 
curity benefits, those benefits are survivors’ benefits. This approach was 
used because it is possible that true survivors’ benefits were recorded in 
the retired worker’s benefits slot. Note that this may not be true in prac- 
tice and the woman may actually be drawing benefits based on her own 
PIA. Beginning with data from the 1971 survey, we  calculate benefits 
either from the RHS (using old age or survivors’ benefits) or from her own 
earnings records.  If survivors’ or old age benefits are not being drawn, 
then Social Security wealth is calculated based only on the widow’s own 
PIA. If survivors’ or old age benefits are drawn (as indicated in RHS), we 
assume that the individual began drawing those benefits at the earliest 
possible age (age sixty). That age is earlier than the earliest age at which 
the widow could draw benefits based on  her own PIA (i.e., age sixty-two). 
Hence, we assume that if the  widow is receiving survivors’ or old age bene- 
fits, she never drew (and never will draw) benefits based on her own PIA. 
We check whether the widow is drawing Social Security or survivors’ 
benefits. If so, then we ask whether she is receiving Social Security in 1969 
(note that in the 1969 survey, no distinction is made between survivors’ 
and old age benefits). If so, then we assume the widow drew benefits at the 
earliest possible age. If she did not draw in 1969, then we assume she be- 
gan to draw in 1970. If a widow did not draw in 1971, then we search for- 
ward to the other survey years. We assume she began to draw benefits (So- 
cial Security or survivors’ benefits) in the year prior to the survey year 
where a positive response was elicited for receiving benefits. If a widow 
has not drawn benefits by the 1979 survey year, then we assume she never 
would draw widows’ benefits. When we find a survey year in which a widow 
was found to receive benefits, we determine widows’ benefits by taking 
the maximum of  survivors’ benefits and old age benefits. We then adjust 
the benefit back to the evaluation year (the adjustment allows for change 
in Social Security law). 
For surviving  widows of  original  1969 male respondents,  however, 
there is information on  the deceased spouse. These widows are allowed to 
draw widows’ benefits if they are greater than the benefits based on their 
own PIA. If the original husband was eligible for benefits by the time he 
died (i.e., had accumulated sufficient quarters of coverage by the year of 
death) but was not old enough to retire by the time of death, then we as- 
sume the person would not have retired until age sixty-five (thus, for a 
widow, she would not be penalized for her husband’s “computed” early 
retirement in the calculation of her benefits). If the deceased husband was 
not eligible for benefits by the  time of his death, then his widow would not 
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If the deceased husband was older than age sixty-five at the time of his 
death, then we search the wage data to determine whether he retired at an 
age greater than sixty-five (the widow does not receive a bonus if her hus- 
band delayed retirement-but  if he retired early, then his basic benefit 
would be reduced for purposes of computing widows’ benefits. This re- 
duction, however, only applies for evaluation years after 1972). Not that 
this is only important for female surviving spouses since for these individ- 
uals, death benefits are computed using the husband’s PIA and any ad- 
justment for early retirement. 
If the husband was sixty-two years of age or younger at the time of  his 
death, then we assume that he had not retired by the year of his death. For 
purposes of calculating widow benefits, we set retirement age of the de- 
ceased husband at sixty-five. If the husband was working in the year prior 
to his death, we assume he did not retire by the time he died. For purposes 
of computing widows’ benefits, we set the husband’s age at retirement at 
sixty-five. Male-surviving-spouse Social Security benefits are computed 
using own PIA information only. 
If  a respondent  does not have sufficient covered quarters of employ- 
ment by the evaluation year to be eligible for Social Security benefits, we 
use information on current employment, state of retirement, and expecta- 
tions about future employment to determine the quarter of eligibility, if 
any. 
Life tables by race and sex were used in all wealth calculations, and an 
interest rate of .03 was used to  discount benefits. 
Calculation of  Human Capital 
The basic idea is to find the actual flow of earnings during the years of 
the RHS, the expected flow during the years after 1979, and then calculate 
an expected present value of earnings using the life tables and a real inter- 
est rate of  .03. We  use conditional labor force participation rates (the 
probability of participating in year t + 1 given participation in year t)  to 
estimate the probability of  earnings in years after 1979 for those not yet 
retired in 1979. The extrapolation and imputation of earnings is now de- 
scribed. 
We calculate human capital by extrapolating income in the evaluation 
year out to age eighty-three using labor force participation rates and life 
tables. Age eighty-three is the last age used in the calculations, because la- 
bor force participation is zero after age eighty-three for all individuals. If 
income is missing in the evaluation year, then it is first imputed from in- 
come data for other years.  Both  forward  and backward  (if  possible) 
searches were made for the imputation, though backward searches were 
tried first. Imputed income is calculated by adjusting a valid income da- 
tum by the ratio of nominal wage indexes and then by adjusting for the 
price level. If income could not be imputed, it was set to zero (only two in- 
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we impute income for the year prior to the evaluation year if that value 
was invalid. 
We needed labor force participation rates for males, married females, 
and single females. The rates were computed by using figures in Bowen 
and Finegan for individuals age fifty-five plus. Those rates are from the 
1960 census. These 1960 figures were adjusted by the change in the labor 
force participation in the population between  1960 and the evaluation 
year.  Values for earlier ages were derived from the Employment and 
Training Report of the President (1981). If figures were not given for each 
age (as was the case for the figures for ages below fifty-five), values were 
interpolated by assigning the mean labor force participation rate to the 
mean age in each age category, and then joining each of those points to 
form a piecewise linear function. Values for each age were then taken 
from this derived function. 
Calculation of Inflation Vulnerability 
Table 5.13 classifies assets and liabilities into three categories: (1) those 
for which unexpected inflation or price shocks do not affect real value, (2) 
those whose real value is eroded, and (3)  those whose real value is in- 
creased (or whose real liability is reduced). We distinguish between a one- 
shot price-level jump, which leaves all interest rates unaffected, and an 
unexpected increase in the (steady) rate of inflation, which causes nominal 
interest rates to  rise. If the scenario is a one-shot, 1 percent jump in prices, 
then nominal assets that are vulnerable lose 1 percent of their real value 
(as do liabilities). However, if the circumstance is a change in the rate of 
inflation accompanied by a rise in nominal interest rates, then the erosion 
in real value of assets or liabilities depends on their maturity. We have as- 
sumed a strict Fisher point-for-point relationship between inflation and 
nominal  interest  rates.  An unexpected 1 percent rise in interest rates 
would roughly reduce the value of a one-year asset by 1 percent, but could 
change the value of a twenty-year asset by 10 or 12 percent, depending on 
the initial interest rate. The sensitivity of the value of long-term nominal 
assets to interest rate fluctuations depends on both the maturity of the as- 
sets and on  the basic interest rate. A change in the rate of interest from 4 to 
5 percent affects value far more than a change from 10 to 11 percent, for 
example. 
The numbers in parts A and B of table 5.13 were constructed using 
available published data where possible. The figure for U.S. bonds was 
calculated using the average maturity and interest rate figures published in 
the Economic Report of the President (1983). The corporate bond figures 
take ten years as the average maturity of long-term corporate bonds and 
use average Baa interest rates during 1969,  1975, and 1979, which were 
7.8, 10.6, and 10.7 percent, respectively. The sensitivity of the value of 
bonds to a 1 percent increase in interest rates declined through time as in- 
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the elderly may hold shorter-than-average  maturity issues of U.S. and 
corporate bonds. 
The private pensions are valued as a nominal annuity lasting the aver- 
age life expectancy of our sample in 1969,1975, and 1979. These numbers 
are certainly not precisely estimated, given the range of ages in the sample 
and the inclusion of couples and both single males and females. The esti- 
mates are consistent with a seventeen-year annuity in 1969, thirteen years 
in 1975, and ten years in 1979, and probably capture inflation risk reason- 
ably accurately. The final inflation vulnerability figures in this chapter are 
quite interesting to  the precision of these assumptions. It is not clear what 
number to estimate for the average duration of bank accounts and loan 
assets. It depends on how fast the interest rate in these contracts adjusts. 
We have assumed that the loans and bank accounts remain outstanding at 
a fixed nominal interest rate for one year. 
Households gain in their wealth position when inflation erodes the real 
value of their liabilities. Again, the extent of  this gain depends on the ex- 
isting interest rate and’the  maturity of the contract. We have gathered fig- 
ures on average mortgage rates from the Economic Report of the Presi- 
dent (1982) and have assumed the maturity of  mortgages for this RHS 
population declines from fifteen years in 1969 to ten years in 1979. Other 
debts, including personal and automobile loans, have an assumed matu- 
rity of roughly three years. 
Once we have estimated the vulnerability of the real value of each asset 
and liability to changes in the nominal interest rates, our computation of 
each household’s vulnerability is straightforward. The vulnerability of  a 
household’s portfolio is simply the weighted average of the vulnerability 
of the assets in that portfolio, where the weights depend on the amount of 
each type of  asset. Take, for example, someone who in 1975 had 75 per- 
cent of his net wealth in corporate bonds, 75  percent in bank accounts, 
and negative 50 percent in mortgages (that is, he had a mortgage liability 
of 50 percent of net worth). His vulnerability to inflation and interest rate 
changes would be 
.75 x 6.1 + .75 x  1.0 - .5(6.1) = 2.25. 
This would indicate that a 1 percent rise in inflation would reduce the value 
of his wealth by 2.25 percent. 
Comparison with Previous Results 
In an earlier paper (1982b) we calculated wealth and inflation vulner- 
ability only over the sample that survived until 1975. It turns out that the 
basic conclusion holds whether we use the sample of survivors or the com- 
plete sample-the  basis for the results of this chapter. For example, we 
previously reported mean wealth in 1969 to be $71,302; it is $76,573 in this 
chapter. The difference is almost entirely due to an increase in pension 
evaluation from $6,645 to $13,663. The change in pension evaluation is 172  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
caused by a more elaborate imputation procedure employed in this chap- 
ter, not to  the sample selection. Median inflation vulnerability, V3,  was .06 
based on the old sample and .03 on the new sample. Both numbers are 
small and the difference is not important. 
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COInment  Sheldon Danziger 
Introduction 
Hurd and Shoven have provided, in their own words, “a  detailed exami- 
nation of the income and wealth of the elderly and their inflation vulner- 
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ability by analyzing the . . .  Retirement History Survey. . . .  This chapter 
is very much an extension of our earlier work” (p. 126). The chapter con- 
tains a wealth of descriptive information, but the documentation is so 
sparse that the reader must accept much of what is presented on the basis 
of what the authors choose to reveal. As a result, my critique consists 
mainly of  a list of questions whose answers could not be found in this 
chapter. These possible sources of bias would not necessarily alter the con- 
clusions, although they would attenuate some of the results. 
Two  quotations illustrate the major conclusions of the two main parts 
of the paper: 
Our overall impression from the RHS data is that as a group the elderly 
maintained their economic position quite well during the 1970s. Their 
incomes held up in the face of growing inflation, and their nonhuman 
wealth actually increased slightly in real terms. (P. 156) 
In this quotation the meaning of quite well is not entirely clear. For ex- 
ample, one can use the Boskin-Hurd price index and compare the change 
in incomes over the 1968-78 decade. The data in tables 5.2 and 5.4  show a 
decline in real income of 18 percent for all elderly households, a 13 percent 
decline for couples, and a 3 percent increase for singles. If we exclude the 
insurance value of Medicare-Medicaid (one of the authors’ adjustments 
that is very ad hoc) from this calculation for both years, the result would 
be a decline of 22 percent for couples and a decline of 10 percent for singles. 
Nonhuman wealth (table 5.6), however, increases by 2 percent for all 
the elderly over the  1969-79  decade even  if  Medicare-Medicaid is ex- 
cluded. Also, the real income of the bottom 10 percent has increased be- 
cause of increased expenditures on public transfer programs. While data 
on the nonelderly are not presented in this paper, it is in comparison to the 
nonelderly that the elderly do “quite well.” That is, over this period the 
real incomes of the elderly fell by less than those of the nonelderly, even 
though most of the elderly had retired. 
We found that government programs can take credit for much of the in- 
flation protection in the sense that private wealth is much more infla- 
tion vulnerable than the sum of private and public wealth. Indexing So- 
cial Security is largely responsible for this fact in that if Social Security 
were not indexed, the elderly would be highly vulnerable to inflation. 
This is especially  true of the poor elderly, a group that under indexing is, 
at the median, completely protected from inflation; without indexing, 
the poor elderly would lose large fractions of their small wealth, were 
the rate of inflation to rise. They would change from being the least vul- 
nerable group among the elderly to being the most vulnerable. (P. 161) 
The latter part of the paper, from which this conclusion is derived, is 
better documented than the first because the authors show the sensitivity 
of the inflation-vulnerability results to some of their assumptions about 
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the relative economic status of the elderly, Hurd and Shoven are the first 
to focus on the distributional effects of inflation among the elderly. 
Sample Selection 
Let me begin my catalog of questions with reference to  the sample selec- 
tivity issue. What difference does it make that in an earlier paper the au- 
thors analyzed survivors, including only those who were in the sample in 
both the initial and terminal years, while in this chapter they included any- 
one who was in the sample in any single year? Obviously this chapter uses 
a larger number of  observations-but  how much larger? Because sample 
size for some of the deciles is already small (e.g., about 75 for single males 
in 1978), comparisons of population subgroups over time could be mis- 
leading even if the means for the entire sample are not very sensitive to this 
issue. 
Using the Current Population Survey computer tapes, I found that the 
cohort of couples who were fifty-five to sixty-four in 1967 and sixty-nine 
to seventy-eight in 1981 was 40 percent smaller for whites and 42 percent 
smaller for blacks in the later year. We know that mortality rates are higher 
for the poor and that the poor are more likely to leave the sample by mov- 
ing in with others or into nursing homes. If more of the poor are excluded 
in the terminal year, then income growth over time is biased upward. In 
fact, in the earlier Hurd and Shoven paper they stated: “Because we study 
changes in economic position, we dropped from the 1969 sample house- 
holds that did not survive until 1975. We were left with 8,244 households 
(a decline of 26 percent from the initial 11,153 heads)” (1982, p.  52). In 
this paper they defend their choice of all observations, because “This both 
expands our sample in 1969 and eliminates a possible bias in our numbers” 
(p. 126). To what bias are they referring? I accept the logic of the first pa- 
per. 
The compositional change in the sample due to differential survivor- 
ship is probably largest for single women and couples. The typical case is 
one in which the husband dies and the widow remains in the sample. If 
poorer males are the most likely to die, then the trend in well-being is bi- 
ased upward for couples, since the poor are not in the terminal-year sam- 
ple. But if the recently widowed women are wealthier than the already- 
widowed or never-married women, then  the change in well-being for 
single women is also biased upward. 
Data Creation 
Turning now to the data creation, I have several additional questions. 
The authors converted wealth to income at a 3 percent real rate of return. 
How sensitive are their results to this discount factor? What if they had 
used actual data on average rates of return that varied by year and by type 
of asset? What I have in mind is the range of actual rates of return shown 175  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
in chapter 11 of this volume, by Farley and Wilensky. Hurd and Shoven 
specify some income as inflation protected when it may not be-for  exam- 
ple, transfers other than Social Security and Medicaid. How sensitive are 
their results to this factor? While the inflation-vulnerability section con- 
siders alternative assumptions, the income and wealth tables do not. 
The authors state: “Responses to questions regarding flows are capital- 
ized to yield wealth figures if  corresponding wealth data were not avail- 
able. Where possible, expected rather than actual flows were capitalized’’ 
(p. 163). Why use expected flows when actual ones are observed? For ex- 
ample,  how  did the authors derive a value for expected income from 
AFDC? Why didn’t they use actual data? 
For how many observations did the authors impute income and wealth 
data? Was it done more for the poor than for the elderly? If so, the proce- 
dure would impart biases since “if a datum could not be imputed by refer- 
ence to the same question in another year for the same respondent, the da- 
tum was set equal to the median of  all nonmissing answers for other 
respondents” (p. 162). Thus, if the poor were most likely to have missing 
data in all the years, then the use of the median would raise well-being and 
reduce inequality relative to their “true” values. 
Hurd and Shoven’s use of a single value for real Medicare and Medicaid 
expenditures for every year for every elderly person is particularly trou- 
blesome. The authors are interested in differences across the income and 
wealth distributions, and these payments vary dramatically by state of 
residence, over time, and by income of the respondent. Since the real val- 
ues of Medicare and Medicaid benefits have eroded in recent years, esti- 
mates of changes in well-being over time will be biased upward. And to 
the extent that residents of poorer states receive below-average Medicaid 
benefits, the results are again upward biased. 
In addition, most Medicaid expenditures for the elderly subsidize nurs- 
ing home residents who are not included in the RHS sample. The appro- 
priate procedure to obtain a Medicare-Medicaid value for persons in the 
RHS is either to reduce the numerator to reflect the insurance value of 
Medicare and Medicaid for the noninstitutionalized or to increase the de- 
nominator  to account for elderly persons in nursing homes. The latter 
procedure also requires an adjustment to the mean level of well-being of 
the cohort, since nursing home residents have below-average income and 
wealth. 
Finally, the aged now spend a higher percentage of their income on 
medical care than they did in the mid-1960s. Could some portion of the 
large increase in Medicare-Medicaid income the authors assign to RHS re- 
spondents, not in a general equilibrium model, be more appropriately as- 
signed to medical care providers? Of course, one would need to distin- 
guish pure price gains to providers from quality and quantity increases. 
This problem is most relevant to comparisons of  the relative economic 176  Michael D. Hurd/John B. Shoven 
well-being of the elderly and nonelderly, but also to differences over time 
for this cohort. 
Life-Cycle Hypothesis 
The authors examine the median nonhuman wealth data in table 5.11 
and suggest that “the numbers are weakly supportive of the life-cycle the- 
ory” because wealth increases with age in 1969 and decreases with age in 
1979. 
But rather than read across the rows (age groups) as the authors do, I 
suggest reading down the columns (years) and focusing on how the wealth 
of  a single-year age cohort changes over the ten-year period.  Consider 
couples, for example. In each age group, real wealth is much higher in 
1979 than in 1969. For example, among those couples whose head was sixty 
in 1969, nonhuman wealth was $63,285 in 1969and $171,060 in 1979. This 
latter figure, adjusted with the Boskin-Hurd index (see table 5.8), is about 
$90,000 in 1969 dollars. Thus, as these couples aged from 60 to 70, and as 
most retired, their nonhuman wealth increased by over 40  percent. I view 
this failure of  wealth to decline as a weak rejection of  the life-cycle hy- 
pothesis. I suggested above that the authors’ choices of sample, data, and 
valuation techniques probably overstated the growth in well-being over 
time. However, I do not think that the alternatives I discussed would turn 
a 40 percent increase in wealth into a decline. 
Conclusion 
I  am confident that  the adjustments  and data concerns I suggested 
would not affect the authors’ strong conclusion that government pro- 
grams substantially increase the well-being of the elderly, reduce inequal- 
ity among them, and make them less vulnerable to inflation. Nor do I 
doubt that the most important contributor to these results in recent years 
has been the indexation of government benefits, particularly Social Secu- 
rity. 
For example, consider the relative economic well-being of two succes- 
sive cohorts of the elderly, one of which is similar to the RHS cohort. Us- 
ing Current Population Survey data, I found that between 1967 and 1981, 
the real-money income of couples whose head was fifty-five to sixty-four 
in 1967 and sixty-nine to seventy-eight in 1981 declined by about 25 per- 
cent. This is consistent with the Hurd-Shoven change in real-money in- 
come. But couples whose head was sixty-nine to  seventy-eight in 1981 had 
real incomes about 25 percent above those of couples who were sixty-nine 
to seventy-eight in 1967. The major source of improvement for the youn- 
ger cohort was that its real Social Security income was more than 50 per- 
cent higher. 
Hurd and Shoven have provided a detailed picture of the progress of 
the elderly over the 1969-79 decade. Although they do  not draw policy im- 177  Inflation Vulnerability, Income, and Wealth of the Elderly 
plications,  one point is  clear. The taxation of  Social Security benefits, 
such as the method enacted in the 1983 Social Security Amendments, will 
have much less adverse distributional impacts on the distribution of well- 
being among the elderly than will any change in benefit indexation. 
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